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Memory of a complex event includes a multitude of features (e.g., objects, people, and 
actions) as well as the overall context (e.g., going to a picnic). To recall a complex event you 
must bind together these features and context into an episodic memory representation. This 
process of binding creates the subjective experience that certain details belong together. In two 
experiments, I examined whether particular types of information are bound together (object-to-
object, object-to-context) within a memory representation of a scene and how attention may 
influence this process. Participants viewed a series of scenes and their attention was drawn to 
some objects (focus of attention), but not others. At test, they attempted to identify previously 
seen objects that were cued by objects-only, context-only, or a blurred context. Exp. 1 provided 
evidence of object-to-object binding when the objects used as cues and targets had been in the 
focus of attention at encoding. Exp. 2 revealed evidence of object-to-context binding, in that 
context cues enhanced memory for target objects whether or not the objects had been in the focus 
of attention at encoding. Altogether, these studies demonstrate the importance of attentional 
deployment in determining which components of an episodic memory will bind together. 




Sometimes when we remember events from our lives, we feel as if we were re-
experiencing the event all over again (Tulving, 1985). For example, suppose you are 
remembering your college graduation. You might vividly recall the person sitting next to you, 
the color of your robes, the annoying way your cap kept falling off, the sound of your name 
being called, and your feelings upon receiving your diploma. Remembering like this feels like 
you are watching a film; as if the memory is a coherent, dynamic whole. In fact, this experience 
is so strong and commonplace that it may be one reason that many people believe that memory 
behaves like a video camera (e.g., Simons & Chabris, 2011). Yet, this feeling is misleading. 
Instead, memories for events are comprised of many independent components that are processed 
and represented separately (Buckner, 2003; Koutstaal & Cavendish, 2006; Schacter, Norman, & 
Koutstaal, 1998; Shiffrin, 2003).    
 If memory of an event is actually made up of many individual components, where does 
the feeling of coherence come from? The answer appears to be in the relationships or bindings 
between individual memory components (e.g., Mather, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2008). These 
bindings, created at the time of encoding, appear critical for enabling accurate recollection 
(Johnson, 1983, 1992). For example, in order to accurately remember that it was your seatmate at 
graduation who told you he felt sick, you would need to have bound that information to other 
information about him (e.g., his face, his voice). Conversely, problems with binding may lead 
people to forget details or make source-monitoring errors (e.g., in the above situation, falsely 
remembering it was your brother that felt sick; Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, & Leding, 2005; 
Lampinen, Ryals, & Smith, 2008; Lyle & Johnson, 2006). Understanding the conditions that 
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affect the reliability of binding is thus of great theoretical and applied interest, and is the focus of 
the following study.    
The current study examines the role of binding in the representation of memories of 
complex events. To do this, participants studied complex visual scenes that are much like those 
encountered in real-world events. These scenes had information that was represented at different 
levels (see Figure 1). As represented in the figure, a scene can include information about its 
theme or gist, the background or context, as well as relationships between groups of items or 
individual items themselves.  
 
Figure 1. Graphic example of the differing levels of abstraction for information in a complex scene.  
3 
There are two main issues explored in this study. The first issue is how different 
components of complex memories are related to each other. One possible structure of an event 
memory is that individual components are relatively independent; in other words, they are bound 
to the overall gist or theme (e.g., a picnic), but are not associated with one another. Alternatively, 
you could imagine that these components are relatively dependent; that is, they are linked to 
other memory components from that event (e.g., the grapes and the wine bottle) as well as to the 
overall gist. To examine this issue, I assessed how cuing one aspect of an event influences the 
retrieval of another. The second issue concerns the role of attention on binding processes. There 
are two aspects to this issue. The first concerns the focus of attention. In event memory research, 
it is common to differentiate between central objects (i.e. objects that are the focus of attention) 
and peripheral objects (i.e. objects away from the focus of attention; Brown, 2003; Levine & 
Edelstein, 2009). In this study, I examined whether the binding between objects differed as a 
function of whether objects had been the focus of attention or not. The other aspect concerns the 
nature of attention paid to an object. Prior researchers have argued that individual components of 
an event need to be actively linked to one another for binding to occur (Johnson, 1983, 1992; 
Morey, 2011). In other words, binding should not occur between different elements (e.g., 
objects) unless attention is paid to their relationship at the time of encoding. In order to examine 
this question, the likelihood that participants focus on how objects within a scene are related to 
each other was manipulated.  
Practical Motivations for the Current Study 
Although the focus of this research concerns the exploration of basic memory questions, it is 
also important to note that answering these types of questions may motivate useful applications 
for real-world situations where memory performance is particularly consequential. For example, 
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it is important for investigators to elicit accurate and complete reports about events from 
witnesses. Understanding how episodic memories are structured can potentially provide ways of 
enhancing or evaluating witness reports. For example, knowing which type of event information 
might better cue other aspects of the event could be useful in the context of an interview. In 
addition, a common problem for investigators is that they often have no way of assessing the 
accuracy for elements of a witness’s statement. However, suppose that an investigator can verify 
the accuracy of a particular detail. Knowing which aspects of an event are likely to be bound to 
this detail may allow the investigator to use this information to assess the likely accuracy of other 
unverified details provided by the witness. 
Topics Discussed 
In the remainder of this introduction, I will first summarize the types of evidence that 
have been interpreted as evidence for binding in memory. Second, I will discuss relevant 
research about the type of information that is bound in memory. This section is further divided 
into research that addresses how specific features (e.g., color, size, location) of an individual 
object are related to one another, research that examines the relationship between context and 
item memory, and the relationship between groups of objects and individual items. I will then 
introduce two relevant theoretical models along with a brief description of the current study’s 
methods. These models, as well as previous experimental findings, will provide the basis for the 






Research Findings Interpreted as Binding 
In the research literature, three types of empirical findings have been interpreted as 
providing evidence for memorial binding. First, it has been argued that evidence for binding is 
obtained when providing one piece of information enables the successful retrieval of another 
related detail (Hollingworth, 2007; Starns & Hicks, 2005, 2008). An example of this is provided 
by research from the associative memory literature (e.g., Epstein & Phillips, 1976; Kleinsmith & 
Kaplan, 1963; Paivio, 1965). In this type of research, participants are asked to study pairs of 
items (e.g., words) and then are given one item in the pair (i.e. one word) to use as a cue to recall 
the missing item. Evidence for associative learning (i.e. binding) is demonstrated when 
participants use this cue to successfully recall the missing component of the item pair. Similarly, 
a second way binding is demonstrated occurs whenever the retrieval of an item is reduced by 
either changing or removing other related items at test (i.e., modifying the available cues; 
Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Hollingworth, 2007). A classic example of this comes from research 
into context effects. Godden and Baddeley (1975) found that the recall of words learned in one 
environment (i.e. underwater) was impaired when testing took place in a different environment 
(i.e. above water). A third, though arguably weaker, form of binding evidence may be obtained 
when the accurate recollection of an item is positively correlated with the accurate recollection of 
another studied item (Fisher & Cuervo, 1983; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Wells & Leippe, 1981). 
For example, Meiser and Bröder (2002) found that when a word was correctly recognized as 
“old”, accuracy for the word’s original font color and its location on the screen was positively 
correlated. They interpreted this finding as evidence that these features (color and location) were 
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bound to one another. In the next section, I will discuss the specific findings of the prior work 
that use these different types of evidence to argue for the presence or absence of binding. 
Binding Research: Features of an Object 
A considerable amount of research in visual perception has examined what has come to 
be known as “the binding problem” (Brockmole & Franconeri, 2009; Treisman, 1999; Treisman 
& Gelade, 1980). At its core, this problem refers to the question of how people are able to 
integrate visual information, such as colors, shapes, and features, into coherent holistic 
representations. That is, how do the features of an object (e.g., color, shape, location etc.) 
become bound to that object? Most of this prior research has examined binding in relatively 
simple visual stimuli (i.e., they contain few features; e.g., shapes, colors) over short delays, using 
measures of change detection and visual search (Eng, Chen & Jiang, 2005; Oakes, Ross-Sheehy, 
& Luck, 2006; Treisman & Zhang, 2006; Vidal, Gauchou, Tallon-Baudry, & O’Regan, 2005). 
The focus of this research literature involves binding as it relates to visual perception, visual 
short-term memory, and visual working memory. In contrast, the current work differs in two 
ways. First, the emphasis is on associations at a higher level – the binding between objects 
(object-to-object binding) and between an object and its context (object-to-context binding). 
Second, the central interest is how this information is represented in long-term memory. 
Although there are relatively few studies examining binding at this higher level (which are 
reviewed later), there is research on feature-to-feature binding within objects in long-term 
memory (Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser, Sattler, & Weißer, 2008; Starns & Hicks, 2005, 2008; 
Uncapher, Otten, & Rugg, 2006; Vogt & Bröder, 2007). This research is particularly relevant to 
the current studies because of the conceptual and methodological issues that are raised. 
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The central question of research on feature binding in long-term memory concerns 
whether features of an object are bound to each other or merely bound to the object itself (see 
Figure 2). Some researchers argue that their findings support a memory structure where the 
features of an object are bound to one another and to the object (see Figure 2A for an illustration 
of this binding hypothesis; Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser et al., 2008; Uncapher et al., 2006). 
The key finding of these studies is that recalling one feature of a word at test, such as font size, 
font color and word location, is significantly correlated with recalling another feature of that 
word.  
  For example, Meiser et al. (2008) presented participants with a series of words that were 
displayed in one of two font sizes and in one of two locations on the screen. During a subsequent 
memory test, participants were asked to make old/new judgments for these studied items. When 
an item was judged to be old, participants were also asked to make a remember/know judgment 
(i.e. a distinct recollection of the word [remember] vs. feeling that the word seems familiar 
[know]) and provide the original font size and word location for that item. Meiser et al., found 
that the features of studied items labeled as “remembered” were stochastically dependent on one 
another; that is, accuracy for one feature was significantly related to accuracy for the other 
feature. This pattern was not obtained for items that were simply “known” to be studied. 
Similarly, Uncapher et al. (2006) had participants study a series of concrete nouns that were 
located in one of four locations on the screen and presented in one of five colors. For each word, 
participants were asked to make a living/non-living judgment about the item. To ensure that 
participants were paying attention to the color feature, when a word appeared in black, they were 
asked to make a judgment concerning that item’s size rather than a living/non-living judgment. 
At test, participants were presented with a list of studied and non-studied words and asked to 
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make an old/new recognition judgment for each item (black items were not included in the test 
lists). When an item was judged “old”, participants were asked to report that item’s original 
location and color. Like Meiser et al., Uncapher et al. found that accurate memory for these 
features was stochastically dependent.    
Starns and Hicks (2005, 2008) argued that previous research examining this question 
suffers from a significant methodological flaw. Because participants are always provided with 
the object information (i.e. the word itself), this information could have been used as a cue for 
both features. Consequentially, any correlations found between the correct recognition of 
features may not reflect binding; instead, this finding may have been due to the strength of the 
memory for the object, including its contextual features (the variable strength hypothesis, see 
Figure 2B). Thus, they contend that the stronger the memory for the object, the greater the 
probability that the object will cue these contextual features. 
 
 
Figure 2. Figure 2. Comparison between (A) binding hypothesis and (B) variable strength 
hypothesis. Both figures represent theories concerning binding of features to an object. 
Configuration A represents the binding hypothesis, which argues that features are bound 
to both the object and one another. Configuration B represents the variable strength 
hypothesis, which suggests that because features are bound to the object, memory 
strength for the object determines the likelihood they will both be recalled. 
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To address this possibility, Starns and Hicks (2008; see also 2005) conducted a series of 
experiments using one feature of an object as a test cue for the other feature of that object. In 
each experiment, participants studied a series of simple line drawings (e.g., hairbrush) where 
each drawing was presented in a different color and location. Specifically, participants were 
shown a screen that had been divided into a 6 X 6 grid. In sequence, a series of colored objects 
appeared in separate grid locations. No two objects were presented in either the same color or the 
same grid location. In other words, each color as well as each grid location was associated with 
only one studied object. Consequently, each presentation of a line drawing created one unique 
feature pair (e.g., turquoise-position 1 in the grid). Afterwards, participants completed an 
old/new recognition test for these studied items. Critically, this old/new recognition test did not 
provide the actual item. Rather, participants were given a color and/or a location and asked if any 
item was studied in that color or that location. For example, in their color condition, participants 
were given trials where a color swath, appeared outside of the grid (i.e. uncued trial), and trials 
where a color marker was presented within the grid (i.e. location cued trial). For both trial types, 
participants were asked to indicate if any line drawing had been studied in that color regardless 
of its location. They argued that if memory for one feature is dependent on another, providing the 
corresponding location of a studied color will enhance memory for that color as compared to 
uncued trials (e.g., accurately judging turquoise as old will be increased if the turquoise marker is 
in its original studied position). Overall, they found that performance on cued trials was no 
different from performance on uncued trials. Providing correct color or location information did 
not improve participants’ recognition of the other feature of a studied item. They interpreted this 
finding, as well as findings from other experiments within this study, to suggest that color and 
location details are bound to the object, but are not bound to one another (Starns & Hicks, 2005, 
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2008; Vogt & Bröder, 2007). Thus, their results were consistent with the variable strength 
hypothesis.   
Although work by Starns and Hicks (2005, 2008) seems to strongly suggest that features 
are not bound to each other, other researchers have argued that there is data to support the 
binding hypothesis. Specifically, Uncapher et al. (2006) used conditionalized source accuracy 
rates for individual features to assess whether the retrieval of one feature was affected by the 
successful retrieval of the other feature. They found that accuracy for these feature judgments 
were not independent. Furthermore, they supplemented this behavioral data with fMRI measures 
that also provided evidence for feature binding. They found that successful retrieval of both the 
location and color of an item was linked to a unique activation pattern (activation in the intra-
parietal sulcus), which was not found for the retrieval of any other items (items associated with 
the correct location or the correct color judgment, but not both). Further, this unique area of 
activation has been previously linked to perceptual binding.  
They argue that the binding found in this work was influenced by participants’ allocation 
of attention during the encoding of these items. Unlike Starns and Hicks (2008), the stimuli and 
procedures in Uncapher et al.’s (2006) learning phase encouraged participants’ to actively attend 
to both the color and location of each item. To encourage attention and increase location 
saliency, each item was placed within a grid that distinctly separated the four locations. 
Participants were compelled to pay attention to the color of each item by requiring a separate 
judgment for items presented in black font. These manipulations may be partially responsible for 
these conflicting findings of Uncapher et al. and Starns and Hicks. 
There are clear similarities between the research question addressed in these studies and 
the current research question as they are both related to the level of abstraction of to-be-bound 
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information. As discussed, one aim of the current work was to examine how the individual parts 
of a complex scene may be related to one another. It could be argued that features of an object 
may be bound together in memory in ways that are analogous to the process used for binding 
components of a complex event. For example, complex events have multiple pieces of 
information (details regarding people, objects, and actions) all bound into the overarching 
memory representation. Comparatively, objects have features such as color, location, and 
orientation bound to them. Thus, an understanding of how item-to-item binding might occur 
should be informed by what is known about inter-feature binding, or how features of an object 
are related to one another in memory. In the subsequent section, I will introduce another area of 
research that has examined the relationship between information from differing levels of 
abstraction - how memory for individual objects is related to overall context and to groups of 
items. 
Binding Research: Effects of Context or Groups of Items on Object Memory 
To date, no research has specifically examined binding between individual objects within 
a complex scene. However, some work has examined the influence of contextual information 
(Brockmole, Castelhano, & Henderson, 2006; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Hollingworth, 1998; 
Hollingworth, 2007; Hollingworth & Henderson, 1999; Hollingworth, Williams, & Henderson, 
2001), as well as information about groups of objects, on memory for individual objects (Brady 
& Alvarez, 2011; Brady, Konkle, & Alvarez, 2009; see also Chun & Turk-Browne, 2008; for a 
review of associative learning in vision). For example, Hollingworth (2007) found that memory 
for an object was enhanced when displayed with its original contextual information at test 
(contextual cueing). Participants in this experiment studied multiple complex scenes and then 
completed a discrimination task for items within these studied scenes. In this discrimination task, 
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test items were displayed either with their original context, another studied context, or with no 
contextual information. Participants were asked to make a “same” or “different” judgment. 
Participants were told to indicate “different” if the object was only similar to the original object 
(i.e. token substitution) or when the test item was oriented differently than the original object 
(i.e. orientation change). They found that discrimination accuracy was highest for those items 
displayed in their original context as compared to the no context or changed context trials. Lower 
accuracy rates for changed context trials suggest that the mere presence of familiar context does 
not enhance memory for the object. Rather, the bond between the item and its original context is 
what enables the context to be a better cue for that item (for similar findings see: Brockmole et 
al., 2006; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Hollingworth et al., 2001).  
Evidence of relationships between an object and other objects from the same scene can be 
found in the visual statistical learning literature. Visual statistical learning examines factors 
associated with the learning of visual stimuli that co-occur frequently (Baker, Olson, & 
Behrmann, 2004; Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2009; Fiser & Aslin, 2001, 2002, 2005; 
Turk-Browne, Jungé & Scholl, 2005). Most pertinent to the current study are the findings of 
Brady, and Alvarez (2011), who found evidence that object memory can be influenced by other 
objects in the same display. In their study, participants were shown 30 displays consisting of 
multiple colored circles of various sizes. Participants studied each display for 1.5 seconds, which 
was followed by a 1 second blank screen. After the offset of each blank screen, a black circle 
appeared in the same spatial location as one of the colored circles. Participants were instructed to 
move their mouse button to estimate the size of the circle previously studied in that location. 
They found that this size judgment was biased according to the average size of other circles 
within the same color set. For example, making a size judgment for a circle that was blue was 
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influenced by the overall average size of all blue circles. Altogether, their results suggest that 
chunks of visual information, grouped together by the observer, have a biasing effect on memory 
for individual items. For this biasing to occur, a relationship between memory for an individual 
item and memory for a grouped unit of items must exist. Thus, this suggests that memory for 
objects are not necessarily stored independently in memory. Although Brady and Alvarez’s study 
examined visual short-term memory, they argue that their results are due to the same 
reconstructive processes that influence long-term memory. Further, they contend that these short-
term memory representations are dependent on information from long-term memory (Hemmer & 
Steyvers, 2009). Thus, this study’s findings are applicable to the current research despite the 
short duration of their memory task. 
Though evidence from both the context cueing and visual statistical learning research 
suggests that some components of a scene may be bound together, there are researchers that 
argue otherwise. In particular, some studies from the eyewitness memory literature have come to 
a different conclusion (Brewer, Potter, Fisher, Bond & Luszcz, 1999; Fisher & Cuervo, 1983; 
Wells & Leippe, 1981). For example, Brewer et al. (1999) found that memory accuracy for a 
given event detail was not correlated with accuracy for other details from that same event. In this 
study, participants first watched a video of a mock robbery and then answered a series of 
questions concerning this event. Their responses were classified into five categories: 1) offender 
description, 2) offender actions, 3) bystander description, 4) bystander actions, and 5) objects. 
Overall, they found no correlation between the accuracy of responses in one category and the 
accuracy of responses in the other categories. They interpreted this lack of correlation as 
suggesting that the individual components recalled in each category were not related to 
components in other categories. Based on a number of studies, they argue that this pattern of 
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results suggests that components of memory are relatively independent (see Fisher, Brewer, & 
Mitchell, 2009). There are, of course, reasons to question this conclusion, including the nature of 
their evidence (correlations between item types). Yet, it could be that objects are bound to the 
overarching theme (or context) of the event, but not to each other. 
 Despite the many differences between these studies, all of the research reviewed in this 
section has examined the relationship between components of a complex memory. From this 
body of research, there is suggestive evidence that there may be binding between objects (object-
to-object) and between objects and their context. Providing contextual information at test 
enhances individual item memory (Brockmole et al., 2006; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Hollingworth, 
2007; Hollingworth et al., 2001). Furthermore, research on visual statistical learning (e.g., Brady 
& Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2009) finds that memory for an object is influenced by memory 
for other groups of objects. With these results, it can be argued that there are clearly discernible 
relationships between individual items and between items and their context. Conversely, there 
are also findings that conflict with this area of research. From the eyewitness literature, studies 
have found no correlation between memory for one detail of an event (or group of related details) 
and memory for other details from that same event (Brewer et al., 1999; Fisher & Cuervo, 1983). 
This finding may suggest that these items are bound only to the event and not to one another. 
Thus, one can see similar arguments arise when considering the evidence for higher-level 
binding (i.e., object-to-object and object-to-context) as when doing so for lower-level binding 
(features-to-features; e.g., Starns & Hicks, 2005, 2008). 
In the next section, I introduce two pertinent theoretical models that consider the issue of 
binding in memory – Marcia Johnson’s Multiple-Entry Modular Memory System (i.e. MEM 
model; 1983, 1992), and Brady, Konkle, and Alvarez’s (2011) Hierarchical Feature Bundle 
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(HFB) model. Both models have important implications concerning my overall research question 
(i.e., general memory structure of complex events/scenes), and my more specific research goals 
(i.e. levels of information and binding). Furthermore, these models will also introduce another 
factor that plays an important part in the current research, namely attention.  
Theoretical Models  
One of the primary goals of the MEM model is to explain how episodic memories can 
acquire details that create the phenomenal sensation of re-experiencing a past event (Johnson, 
1983, 1992). That is, this model seeks to explain how and when certain features become bound 
to a memory record. It does this by describing a series of cognitive actions that are theorized to 
be involved in the creation of these memories. These actions are categorized into four 
subsystems, two perceptual sub-systems (P1 and P2), and two reflective sub-systems (R1 and 
R2; see Johnson, 1992). The actions of the perceptual sub-systems allow us to process and 
integrate perceptual information. For example, some of the actions of this subsystem include 
locating objects in the environment, tracking stimuli, and extracting the features necessary to 
identify stimuli. Alternatively, the actions of the reflective sub-systems enable us to maintain, 
organize, and refresh information. The reflection subsystem allows us to reactivate and maintain 
information learned in the past so that it can be easily used or associated with new information. 
Moreover, this subsystem is responsible for the creation of a coherent series of events, including 
the building of relationships between items, actions, and context. Thus, it is fundamental in 
building the necessary links between individual memorial details and the overall episodic 
memory. In short, an essential operation of the reflection subsystem is to bind information 
together.  
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As previously mentioned, the reflection subsystem is divided into two units, R1 and R2. 
The actions ascribed to both the R1 and R2 units can be described as fulfilling two functions: 
making information available for use (or further processing) and creating associations. For 
example, the cognitive actions of the R1 unit include, noting relationships, shifting attention, 
refreshing information and reactivating information. The R2 unit provides actions that 
correspond to, but are more deliberate than, the actions of the R1 unit. They include activities 
such as discovering relationships, initiating attention, rehearsing information, and retrieving 
information.  
The functions of both the perceptual and the reflective sub-systems are coordinated and 
controlled by our agendas. These agendas include both our goals (varying from very general to 
task specific) and a series of steps that will be used to achieve these goals. Through coordinating 
the cognitive actions of the perceptual and reflective sub-systems, agendas play a critical role in 
separating central information from peripheral information. Simply put, central information is 
anything that may be important to the completion of that agenda. This agenda-relevant 
information is made more accessible through functions such as noting, shifting, refreshing, and 
reactivating. Noting and shifting functions create relationships by shifting attention from one 
item (or aspect of an item) to another item (or aspect), then noting how they may be related (i.e., 
similarities, differences etc.). As elements are associated and combined, information is organized 
into a mental representation making specific information easier to locate. Refreshing and 
reactivating functions serve to either maintain or increase the availability of item or relationship 
information. As these functions repeat, the fidelity of the item or the strength of the relationship 
information is increased. Together, these functions produce a more cohesive memory 
representation.  
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Several aspects of this model are particularly important to the current research. First, this 
model suggests that any information may be bound together. Once relations have been noted or 
discovered, evidence for binding between these individual elements may be demonstrated. 
Second, attention plays an essential role in this binding process (see also Uncapher et al., 2006). 
Third, a person’s goal, or agenda plays a critical role in what is attended to, organized and 
strengthened in the memory representation (see also Morey, 2011).  
Like the MEM model, Brady et al.’s (2011) Hierarchical Feature Bundle (HFB) suggests 
that complex visual scene memory is comprised of visual information stored at various  levels of 
representation (e.g., features, objects, conceptual representations, etc.). More specifically, they 
suggest that as attention is guided to sub-regions of a complex scene your memory for features, 
objects, and scene information accumulates. This accumulated information is stored at multiple 
levels of representation (from basic features to scene information) and organized into a 
hierarchical structure. It is this structure that will guide any further attention to this scene and 
will also aid in the interpretation of any newly encoded information. In addition to influencing 
attention, they also suggest that information, represented at these varying levels, can influence 
memory for a single item. This would suggest that these levels of abstraction can interact (i.e., 
“are mutually informative and constraining”, Brady et al., 2011, p. 22). For example, your 
memory of a wedding scene (scene level representation) may influence your memory for what 
one individual guest was wearing (item level representation), resulting in a bias to recall more 
formal clothing (scene level representation influencing item representation). Brady et al. finds 
support for this claim from research examining contextual effects on visual memory and research 
in visual statistical learning (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2009).  
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In summary, several theories have made the argument that individual components of a 
complex event can be bound to one another. Furthermore, theoretical arguments have been made 
for attention playing a vital role in the process of binding (Brady et al., 2011; Cowan, 2005; 
Johnson, 1983, 1992; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Mammarella & Fairfield, 2008; 
Morey, 2011). In particular, some have suggested that binding only occurs when attention is 
devoted to the individual items and to the creation of the binding (Morey, 2011). For the 
purposes of this study, attention is simply defined as employing cognitive resources to activate 
either sensory and/or memorial information. Thus, you are attending to an object in your 
environment when information regarding that object (e.g., category, color, location) is at a 
heightened state of activation (Cowan, 2005).  
Empirical Findings in Attention and Binding  
Beyond the theoretical arguments, there is also empirical support for attention as an 
important factor in the binding process. For instance, binding appears to be disrupted in 
conditions where attention is divided (Brown & Brockmole, 2010; Troyer & Craik, 2000; 
Troyer, Winocur, Craik, & Moscovitch, 1999), in older adults (i.e., age-related attentional 
deficits; Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Craik, Luo, & Sakuta, 2010; Hashtroudi, Johnson, Vnek, & 
Ferguson, 1994; Mitchell, Johnson, Raye, Mather, & D'Esposito, 2000) or when attention is 
captured by arousing stimuli (Mather, 2007; Mather et al., 2006; Mather & Sutherland, 2011).  
Other research suggests that attention plus an intention to bind items together may be what is 
required to find evidence of binding. For example, Morey (2011) examined how item-location 
binding was influenced by the nature of attention and set size. She found that an explicit 
intention to bind items to their locations resulted in increased accuracy for item-location 
judgments as compared to an incidental binding condition. Moreover, this difference in accuracy 
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increased as a function of set size (i.e., the number of items and locations to be bound). This 
suggests that not only is attention essential for binding, but that certain circumstances may also 
require a deliberate intention to encode these associations.      
Studies have also found that the focus of attention can influence binding (Boywitt & 
Meiser, 2012; Johnson, Nolde, & DeLeonardis, 1996). For example, Johnson et al., demonstrated 
how the focus of attention could affect peoples’ ability to bind content information to source 
information. Participants in their study were asked to listen to presentations given by two 
separate speakers. Focus of attention was manipulated between-subjects by asking participants to 
either 1) focus on how the statements made them feel (i.e. self-focused condition) or 2) focus on 
how they believe the speaker felt about each of their own statements (i.e. speaker-focused 
condition). Following the speeches, participants were asked to identify whether the provided 
statement originated from speaker 1, speaker 2 or neither (i.e. a new statement not previously 
presented). Accurately ascribing source to a previously studied statement required participants to 
have correctly bound the identity of the speaker to the content of the information. They found 
that participants who focused on the speakers feelings had superior source accuracy compared to 
participants who focused on themselves. More importantly, they found that the two conditions 
did not differ in overall accuracy for the content of the statements themselves. That is to say, the 
attention manipulation did not affect participants’ ability to recognize that a statement was old 
(previously uttered by one of the speakers) or new. This suggests that the attention manipulation 
significantly affected binding, but had no effect on memory for content (old/new recognition). 
Johnson et al. (1996) contended that this finding underscores the critical role attention plays in 
the binding process.  
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     In following with the arguments of both theoretical and empirical research, the current 
study examined how attention influences the creation of memorial bindings between items within 
a complex visual scene and between individual items and their context. One important 
manipulation for this study involved the level of attention devoted to a given object within a 
scene. In summary, the current study explored how deploying attention to selected individual 
items within a complex scene affected the bindings between items and the bindings between 
individual items and their context.  
Analogy between Starns and Hicks’ (2008) Procedure and the General Procedure Used in 
Current Studies 
To ensure that the current work measured binding and not variability in memory strength, 
the experimental design was modeled on Starns and Hicks’ (2008) procedure. In this and 
subsequent sections, I will describe the similarities and differences between Starns and Hicks’ 
design and the current methodology. Then I will provide a more detailed description of 
Experiment 1’s methodology and procedure. This will be followed by predictions for Experiment 
1.  
Earlier, I described Starns and Hicks’ (2008) work as having goals analogous to the aims 
of the current study. In their experiments, they sought to examine whether individual features of 
an object were bound to each other, as well as to the object itself. Likewise, the current study 
examined whether components of a complex scene (i.e. objects) were bound to one another, or 
merely to the overarching memory of the scene (see Figure 3 for a pictorial comparison between 
Starns and Hicks’ work and Experiment 1). More specifically, the principle question Starns and 
Hicks sought to address concerned whether reinstating one feature of an object would cue 
memory for a second feature of that same object. They argued that if the presented feature cued 
memory for a second feature, it would suggest that these feature dimensions are bound together 
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in memory. In a similar fashion, the primary question of the current work asked whether the 
presentation of selected objects would cue participants’ memory for other objects within that 
scene.  
A second similarity between Starns and Hicks (2008) and the current work concerns the 
need to obtain a clear measure of binding. They have argued that earlier research examining this 
feature binding question had a flaw; the original object was always presented along with the 
other feature dimensions. They argued that any correlations between participants’ memory for 
one feature and a second feature might have been mediated by their memory for the object (see 
Figure 2 for reference). Thus, presenting the original object could have cued participants’ 
memory for either both or neither features (depending on the strength of their memory for that 
item). To correct for this, Starns and Hicks presented only the features of an object (i.e., color 
and/or location), rather than the object itself. Likewise, the current study presented individual 
objects of the scene as cues separated from the original background information. 
 For the purposes of comparing Starns and Hicks’ (2008) procedure to the current study, 
the following is a brief summary of their methodology. First, participants were asked to study a 
series of 18 colored objects presented within a grid. Following this encoding phase, participants 
were given a memory test concerning the features of those objects. During the recognition phase, 
participants indicated whether an item had been studied, a) in this color (e.g., color condition) or 
b) in this location (e.g. location condition). For half of their judgments, participants were given 
only the feature that was related to the test question (i.e., color or location; uncued trials). 
Specifically, participants in the color condition were given a colored swatch and those in the 
location condition were given a black marker indicating the location in the grid. In other 
judgments, participants were given both features (i.e., color and location; cued trials), but were 
22 
told to make their judgments solely from the feature indicated for their condition; in both 
conditions, participants saw a colored marker within the grid. Thus, a key question in this 
procedure was whether the presence of the additional feature in the cued trial would lead to 
better memory performance than when the additional feature was lacking (uncued trials). 
 In the current study, participant studied a series of complex scenes that included a large 
number of objects rather than individual objects presented alone (as in Starns & Hicks, 2008). 
Because the goal, in the first experiment, was to examine binding between objects rather than 
memory strength for the scene, the testing phase did not provide the original stimuli (i.e. scene) 
as a cue. Similar to Starns and Hicks (2008), trials in the testing phase were divided into two 
types, no-object cue trials, and object-cued trials; each provided only selected information from 
the original scene. 
 
A) Starns and Hicks                    B)  Experiment 1 
 
 
Figure 3. A pictorial comparison between the aims of Starns and Hicks’ (2008) experimental goal 
(A) and Experiment 1’s goal (B). 
 
23 
 For the no-object cue trials, participants were given a target marker indicating the 
location of a missing object. Because objects from many scenes had the same approximate 
spatial location, some scene information was required so that the target marker clearly denoted 
one specific object. However, as was previously noted, it was critical that participants not be 
provided with the original scene information to make their judgment. As a result, these target 
markers were superimposed over a modified and blurred version of the original scene. 
Modifications to the original scene were as follows. First, all individual objects were removed; 
all information that remained (e.g., large furniture, fixtures, and the general layout of the room) 
was considered background information. Second, this remaining background information was 
blurred so that only color and indistinct shapes were visible (see Figure 4 for an example of an 
original learning phase scene and the no-object and object-cued trial scenes derived from it; see 
Appendix A for more detailed images).  
 Object-cued test trials also included a target marker denoting the location of a specific 
object. In Experiment 1, these target markers were superimposed on top of a blurred version of 
the original scene, the same as for no-object cue test trials. The only difference between the two 
test trial types was the addition of three selected objects that were reinserted into the scene in 
their original spatial locations. It is important to note that these objects were unaltered from the 
original scene
1
 (i.e. their visual clarity was unchanged; see Figure 4 for an example of an object-
cued test trial).  
                                                          
1
 To examine object-to-context binding, Experiment 2 superimposed both the target marker and 
the three object cues over the original, non-obscured, contextual information. See Experiment 2’s 
methods section for further details.   
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By using a procedure analogous to Starns and Hicks (2008), I was also able to use similar 
measures of binding. In their research, accuracy differences between the two trial types could 
only be the result of the presence or absence of a second feature. Consequentially, if accuracy for 
object-cued trials was significantly greater than no-object cue trials, this would suggest that the 
objects that were present were capable of cuing memory for other objects. This would provide 




Learning Phase Scene 
Object-Cued Trial 
No-Object Cue Trial 
 
Figure 4. Comparison between a learning phase trial scene and its corresponding testing phase scenes 
(object-cued and no-object cue trials). The red square is the location cue provided during the test trial. 
Objects from the original learning phase scene were used as retrieval cues for object-cued test trials. 
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Purpose of Current Studies 
 As I noted in the introduction, the current studies were designed to examine two major 
questions. The first concerns how different components of a complex event are related in 
memory. In these experiments, I focused on whether there was evidence of object-to-object 
binding (Exp. 1 and to some extent, Exp. 2) and object-to-context binding (Exp. 2). As described 
above, I employed a procedure to evaluate these issues that was conceptually based on the 
procedure used by Starns and Hicks (2008) to evaluate feature-to-feature binding. The second 
question concerns the role of attention on binding processes. In both experiments, I examined 
whether objects that were the focus of attention (central objects) were better cues to memory 
than were objects that were away from the focus of attention (peripheral objects). In other words, 
were central objects more likely to be bound to one another than peripheral objects? In 
Experiment 1, I also assessed whether the nature of attention paid to objects played a role in 
binding. Prior researchers have argued that individual components of an event need to be 
actively linked to one another for binding to occur (Morey, 2011). In this experiment, I 
manipulated the degree to which encoding processes were focused on the relationships between 
objects in the scenes.  
Experiment 1: Goals and Hypotheses 
Experiment 1 was designed to evaluate 1) whether object-to-object binding occurs 2) if 
so, whether binding is moderated by focus of attention at encoding and 3) whether people must 
deliberately attend to associative information in order to bind objects together. As described 
above, participants were presented with a series of scenes. During this learning phase, attentional 
focus was varied such that some objects were the focus of attention (central-objects) while others 
were less likely to receive attention (peripheral objects). This was accomplished by presenting 
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the complex scene in tandem with auditory information that highlighted particular objects within 
the scene. Peripheral objects were not discussed in the auditory presentation.  
Furthermore, I also manipulated how participants attended to these objects. Participants 
in one condition were provided with auditory information that drew attention to individual 
objects in the form of a narrative, encouraging them to attend to objects and how these objects 
were associated with one another. These participants were compared to participants in a second 
condition, the labels condition, who merely heard the names of a series of objects with no 
additional associative information. 
After being presented with both the scene and auditory information, participants were 
given a forced-choice recognition test for selected items from each scene. On each trial, 
participants attempted to identify the original object that appeared at the target location by 
choosing from a “lineup” of objects taken from other scenes. Each test scene displayed only 
selected information from the originally encoded learning phase scene. The type of information 
from the learning phase scene varied according to the following trial types: 1) no-object cue test 
trials, and 2) object-cued test trials. However, in line with the attention manipulation, the object-
cued trials were further segmented with respect to whether the selected objects were central or 
peripheral objects only. That is to say, each object-cued trial displayed only central objects or 
peripheral objects.  
The first hypothesis I evaluated was whether object-to-object binding occurred. Evidence 
for this would be demonstrated if identification accuracy was significantly higher for either 
central or peripheral-object cued trials compared to no-object cue trials. My second hypothesis 
concerned whether focus of attention moderated binding processes. If attention does moderate 
binding, this would suggest that I would find a significant difference between central and 
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peripheral-object cued trials. In other words, if increased attention at encoding increases the 
likelihood that objects would be bound to each other, then participants’ memory for objects 
should benefit more from central-object cues compared to peripheral-object cues
2
.  
Finally, the third goal of Experiment 1 was to examine whether attention to associations 
at encoding is necessary for binding to occur. To address this question, I included a between-
subjects manipulation that varied whether participants’ attention focused on the objects alone 
(labels condition) or focused on both the objects and the associative information between the 
objects (narrative condition). The motivation for this manipulation comes from previous 
theoretical and empirical arguments that suggest that binding may not result from attention alone 
(Johnson, 1983, 1992; Morey, 2011). In particular, the previously described MEM model 
suggests that attention is necessary for the active creation of links between individual items 
(using functions such as discovery and rehearsal in the R2 subsystem). It may be interpreted to 
suggest that some instances of binding may also require intention; that is, one must deliberately 
encode associative information in order to bind two or more pieces of information. I 
hypothesized that if binding required an intention to encode the associations between individual 
items (Morey, 2011), then evidence of binding in the narrative condition (which included objects 
and object relationship information) should be greater than in the labels condition (which 
focused on objects alone). 
  
                                                          
2 In particular, central object test cues should be stronger cues to other central objects than they 
are cues to peripheral objects. 
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Experiment 1: Methods 
Participants 
  A total of 156 LSU students participated in Experiment 1 (78 in each condition; narrative 
and labels). A power analysis for Exp. 1, computed using G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & 
Lang, 2009) suggested that the appropriate number of subjects to achieve 80% power was 164. 
This value was determined based on the following parameters: A) an ES f of .10 (small effect 
size f), B) a type I error rate of .05, C) a within-subjects ANOVA with three levels, and D) an 
estimated .50 correlation between measures. Participants were comprised of students taking 
psychology courses at Louisiana State University who received course credit for their 
involvement.  
Experimental Design 
This experiment utilized a 3 x 2 x 2 mixed model design with Test Cue type (i.e. no-
object cue, central-object cued, and peripheral-object cued) and Target type (i.e. central or 
peripheral target object) as the within-subjects factors and Attention condition (narrative and 
labels) as the between-subjects manipulation. 
Stimuli 
Learning phase scenes. A series of 12 complex visual scenes were used for the current 
study. Scenes were created using the SIMS™ software program. This software is ideal for 
creating and modifying realistic images of 3D environments. (see Figure 5 for an example). Each 
scene displayed 17 unique objects were classified as one of the following scene types: bedroom, 
living room, or personal office. Each scene, both across and within these categories, differed 
with respect to layout, color scheme, furniture, and objects. Furthermore, each scene of these 12 
scenes had a corresponding counterbalanced version to ensure that memory for any individual 
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item did not depend on its physical location within the scene. To that end, each counterbalanced 
version contained the same background information and objects (how this was categorized will 
be discussed below), but differed as to where individual objects were located. That is, select 
objects in the scene switched locations with other objects from that scene.    
The following guidelines were used to categorize scene information into objects and 
background information (context). First, all items classified as objects were easily manipulated 
by hand; anything that was too large, heavy, or immobile was considered contextual information 
(e.g., large furniture, fixtures). Second, only those items that an individual could hold, move, or 
use were categorized as objects; anything that was a static part of the environment was also 
considered background information. Third, due to the nature of the task, objects were an 
individual unique part of a scene; items that were components of a larger whole (e.g., toys in a 
basket) or segments in a series (e.g., books on a bookshelf) were not considered individual 
objects for the purposes of this experiment.  




Figure 5. Example scene from the learning phase. Counterbalanced versions A and B. In version 




Learning phase auditory information. Each of the visual scenes was also paired with 
auditory information. The auditory information and its corresponding scene were presented 
simultaneously. This audio information served to emphasize certain objects within the scene. The 
current study included two types of auditory information that varied between-subjects.  
Narrative condition auditory information. For some participants, the auditory 
information presented with each scene was in the form of a narrative (i.e. narrative condition). 
Each narrative focused on a hypothetical person and his or her interaction with a series of six 
objects within the scene. These objects will now be referred to as central (items or objects). The 
same hypothetical person was used for each scene within a scene type (e.g., “Jennifer” was the 
focus of all bedroom scenes)
3
.Take for example the following short description of a scene 
centered on a woman named Jennifer.  
“Jennifer set out to write a killer short story for a writing competition. After quickly 
straightening her poster, she walked over to the chalkboard and scribbled down some notes for 
her paper. She then, opened up the wooden chest and grabbed some writing supplies. After 
sitting at her desk, she moved her dragon statue to make more room to write. Finally, she took a 
pen out of the penholder, and began writing. Despite throwing away several drafts of her paper 
into the trashcan, she finally completed her killer story. “  
Labels condition auditory information. For other participants, the auditory information 
was not in the form of a cohesive story; instead, six selected objects were named with no 
additional information provided. More specifically, participants in this labels condition heard 
                                                          
3 This measure was taken to ensure that participants could not use the “type” of scene (e.g., 
living room) as a cue for a specific hypothetical person’s story. For example, a living room scene 
could not be used as a cue for Jennifer’s unique story; Jennifer was associated with all four 
stories that took place in each of the four living rooms. 
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only the name of six (central) objects spoken sequentially. Each object label was heard in the 
same temporal position as its object counterpart in the narrative condition. Using the previous 
scene example, participants in the labels condition heard the following. 
“-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------




----trashcan ---------------------------------------- “  
In both conditions, five peripheral items were selected from the remaining objects not 
referenced in the audio file. Furthermore, items selected as peripheral were 1) irrelevant to the 
narrative (or not mentioned in the labels condition) 2), not located within two-inches of any 
central object and 3) not in the direct path between two central objects that were discussed (or 
named) consecutively. 
Like the visual scenes, all auditory files also had a corresponding counterbalanced 
version. These versions served to counterbalance the attention manipulation for the central and 
peripheral objects. That is, all objects discussed in version A became peripheral objects in 
version B, and correspondingly, the peripheral objects in version A were the focus of the 
auditory information in version B. All counterbalanced auditory files were paired with their 
associated scene’s counterbalanced version. To reiterate, the only difference between the original  
visual scenes and their counterparts is the physical location of certain objects. In particular, 
central objects switched locations with peripheral objects (see Figure 5 for example).  
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Testing phase scenes. During the testing phase, altered versions of the 12 studied scenes 
were presented. Each test scene contained: 1) a blurred version of the learning phase scene, 2) a 
red square indicating the location of the target object, and 3) an array of six objects located at the 
bottom of the screen. Due to the aims of the current study, and the nature of binding research, it 
was critical that participants were not provided with the original scene while they were making 
their identification judgments (e.g., Starns and Hicks, 2008). However, due to the nature of the 
task (i.e., multiple objects sharing a single location over the course of the 12 scenes), it was 
necessary to provide enough “scene” information to isolate a single object as the missing target 
object.   
Each test scene contained information from the original scene that was both edited and 
blurred; however, some of these test scenes displayed more information than other test scenes 
(i.e. select objects). Accordingly, test scenes were separated into one of two categories – no-
object cue test scenes and object-cued test scenes.  
No-object cue test scenes. For the no-object cue test scenes, the distorted version of the 
original learning phase scene was created using the following transformations. First, all objects 
were removed from the original scene (refer to object classification guidelines described above). 
Second, the remaining contextual information was distorted using a Gaussian blur filter, which 
uses a normal distribution to transform the original pixels. The effect is a blurring of the original 
image, similar to looking through a translucent film. The filter for each scene was set to a pixel 
radius of 25. This parameter was set to ensure that any detail information was eliminated and 
only indistinct colored shapes remained from the original contextual information.   
Object-cued test scenes. Like the no-object cue test scenes, object-cued test scenes used 
the same transformations in creating their distorted versions of the original studied scenes. 
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However, following these transformations, three objects from the original scene were re-inserted 
in their original spatial locations. These three objects were selected from that scene’s set of 
central or peripheral objects. Accordingly, each object-cued test scenes will now be referred to as 
either central-object cued or peripheral-object cued.  
Across all participants in the experiment, all scenes served as both no-object cue and 
object-cued scenes (central and peripheral) equally often.  
Targets and lineup arrays. For each test scene, half of the target objects were central and 
half were peripheral; the order in which targets were identified was random. Each target was 
associated with a different object lineup array. Five objects in the array were lures selected from 
objects studied in other scenes (and thus were familiar); the remaining object was always the 
target. Of the five object lures, there was a central and a peripheral object (each taken from 
different scenes) and the remaining three objects were filler (i.e., additional objects from other 
scenes not designated as central or peripheral). When an object appeared as a lure, it did not 
serve as either an object cue or a target for any test scene within this particular testing phase. 
Similarly, when an object served as an object cue, it did not appear as either a lure or a target 
within this testing phase. 
  Each test scene was classified as either a no-object cue or object-cued test scene. Each 
participant received four no-object cue test scenes and eight object-cued test scenes (four central 
and four peripheral), presented in a single randomized order. Participants made four 
identification judgments for each scene. This means that each participant made eight central and 
eight peripheral object identifications associated with each of the three trial types, for a total of 
48 test items (see Figure 6 for a schematic of this identification breakdown). Across the 
experiment, each learning phase scene served as each type of test scene equally often.   
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Procedure 
Participants were run in groups of up to four. The experimental procedure was divided 
into a learning phase and a testing phase. Before beginning the learning phase, participants were 
told that they would see a series of scenes and that each scene would contain numerous objects. 
It was their job to try to remember each scene because they would be tested on that information 
in a later part of the experiment. They were also told that each scene was to be accompanied by a 
short story describing an event that occurred in the picture (narrative condition), or that they 
would hear the names of various objects within the scene. In both conditions, participants were 
instructed to pay close attention to the auditory information that accompanied each scene 
because they would be asked about a visual detail associated with one of the objects mentioned 
in the audio file following each scene. Participants were then told to put on headphones and 
begin when they were ready. 
 
 
Figure 6. Diagram providing information concerning the categorization of identifications in the testing 
phase. Central and peripheral objects were those that were and were not, respectfully, the focus of attention 
in the auditory information provided during the learning phase. 
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 Learning phase. Prior to each scene, a “get ready” signal appeared for 1 second. 
Afterward, a scene and corresponding auditory file began simultaneously. The duration of each 
scene and its associated auditory information was 25 seconds. Following their offset, participants 
answered a short multiple-choice question, concerning an object that was mentioned in the audio 
file. For example, in the narrative condition, participants answered the question, “When Jennifer 
wrote her paper, what colors were the pencils she had to choose from? 1) Red and Green 2) Blue 
and Black 3) Black and Green 4) Red and Blue. Similarly, those participants in the labels 
condition were asked the following question, “What colors were the pencils in the pencil holder? 
1) Red and Green 2) Blue and Black 3) Black and Green 4) Red and Blue” (objects referenced in 
these questions did not appear in the testing phase). Accuracy for these responses was used to 
assess whether individual participants were completing the task as instructed. Following their 
response, participants would see the “get ready” signal, which was again followed by the next 
scene presentation. Scenes were presented in a set random order. After studying all 12 scenes 
and answering their associated multiple-choice questions, text appeared on the screen asking 
participants to wait for experimenter instructions. Once all participants had completed the 
learning phase, they were provided with instructions for the testing phase of the experiment. 
These testing phase instructions were both on the screen and read aloud; reading the testing 
phase instructions took approximately four minutes. 
 Testing phase. During this part of the experiment, participants were presented with a 
series of test scenes derived from the 12 learning phase scenes. Before beginning the testing 
phase, participants were given instructions concerning the test’s objectives and organization. 
Specifically, they were told that they were about to see a series of altered versions of the scenes 
that they had studied during the learning phase. Furthermore, they were told that each of these 
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previously studied scenes would have missing objects and the background information would be 
blurred. They were told that their goal would be to try to remember selected objects from each 
scene. 
In each test scene, a red square marked the location of a missing object. It was their task 
to identify what object was originally studied in that location when they saw that scene in the 
learning phase. They made their identifications by selecting the correct missing object from an 
object lineup that was located at the bottom of the screen. For each scene, they were asked to 
identify four missing objects, one at a time. Following each identification, they were also asked 
to rate their confidence in each judgment. 
Additionally, they were also told that some scenes contained more information than 
others did. They were then provided with a description of these scene types. It was explained that 
some test scenes contained only a blurry version of the original scene’s background, while other 
test scenes contained both this blurry background information and a few objects from the original 
scene in their original locations. They were instructed to do their best to use the available 
information to make an accurate identification (for either type of scene). After receiving these 
instructions, participants began the first set of identifications in the first test scene trial. 
Participants completed the following sequence of events for each of the 12 test scenes 
(see Figure 7). First, a screen appeared asking participants to “get ready for the next scene”. 
After 1 second, the test scene appeared with one red square marking the location of a missing 
target object. Participants were instructed to select the target object from the objects in the 
lineup. In particular, they were asked to press the number associated with their chosen object (1-
6). Following the identification, a second screen appeared asking participants to estimate their 
confidence in this judgment on a scale from 1 (guessing) to 7 (very sure). After making their 
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confidence rating, the previous scene reappeared, but now the red square was in a second 
location and the previous objects in the lineup were replaced with another set of objects. They 
were then asked to identify this new target object. This process continued for two more 
identifications. Following the fourth identification and confidence rating, the screen asking 
participants to “get ready for the next scene” appeared again. Once participants completed this 
process for all 12 scenes, they were asked a series of demographic questions and then received a 




Figure 7. A graphic representation of the testing phase. 
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Experiment 1: Results 
For both experiments reported here, partial eta squared was used as the estimate of effect 
size and α <  .05 was used as the criterion for statistical significance. Descriptive statistics 
concerning the accuracy of performance for participants in both attention conditions are 
displayed in Table 1. Because each lineup contained six objects, the probability of choosing the 
correct target by chance is 16.6%. 
The major question motivating Experiment 1 was whether object-to-object binding 
occurs. This involved two separate questions. Does binding depend on the focus of attention 
during encoding? Is binding enhanced by drawing attention to the role played by items in an 
event? To address these questions, a 2 (Target type) X 3 (Test Cue type) X 2 (Attention 
condition) mixed model ANOVA, with Target type and Test Cue type manipulated as within-
subjects variables, was conducted with accuracy rate as the dependent variable. The primary 
analyses concentrate on how the type of cue (i.e., no-object cue vs. object-cued test scenes) will 
influence the probability of identifying the correct target object. As previously described, all 
target objects were either the focus of attention at encoding (i.e. central) or they were not (i.e. 
peripheral). Because it was predicted that focus of attention will have a significant impact on 
object-to-object binding, I will also focus on the interaction between test cue type (no-object, 
central vs. peripheral-object cued) and target type (central vs. peripheral) on accuracy. 
Table 1 
Mean Identification Accuracy Performance  
 Attention Conditions 
 Narrative Labels 
 Central Targets Peripheral Targets Central Targets Peripheral Targets 
Test Cue Type     
          Central 0.63 (.02) 0.22 (.02) 0.70 (.02) 0.18 (.02) 
         Peripheral 0.58 (.02) 0.21 (.02) 0.62 (.02) 0.19 (.02) 
          No-object 0.56 (.02) 0.24 (.02) 0.64 (.02) 0.19 (.02) 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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For the question of whether deliberate attention to the role played by an object at 
encoding is required to bind objects together, I will focus on whether the type of information 
given during encoding influences object-to-object binding. As noted earlier, a between-subjects 
manipulation of attention varied the type of information provided during the encoding phase. 
Those in the narrative condition attended to both specified objects and the role those objects 
played in the event, while participants in the labels condition were merely told to focus on 
specific objects and received no additional associative information. Below I discuss the results 
from the omnibus analysis broken down by the effects and interactions that are relevant to a 
particular hypothesis. 
Object-to-Object Binding  
Is binding mediated by attention? The omnibus analysis yielded both a significant main 
effect of target type, with higher accuracy rates for central targets (M = .62) as compared to 
peripheral targets (M = .20), F(1,154) = 1092.33, p < .01, MSE = .04, ηp
2
= .88, and a significant 
main effect of test cue type, F(2,308) = 3.57, p = .029, MSE = .02, ηp
2
= .02. Pairwise 
comparisons indicate that test cues using central objects elicited significantly higher performance 
(M = .43) compared to either test cues containing peripheral objects (M = .40) or test cues that 
did not contain any objects (M = .41).  
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction between cue type 
and target type, F(2,308) = 5.72, p = .004, MSE = .03, ηp
2
= .04, with the highest accuracy rates 
associated with central targets cued by central objects. See Figure 8 for a graphical 
representation. To explore this interaction paired sample t-tests were conducted. Most pertinent 
to the hypotheses regarding focus of attention are the comparisons between central targets cued 
with central objects (vs. no objects) and peripheral targets cued with central objects (vs. no 
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objects). For central targets, accuracy was significantly higher when central objects were used as 
cues (M = .67) as compared to when no objects were present in the test cue (M = .60; t(155) = 
3.48, p = .001, MSE = .02). Additionally, peripheral-object cues (M = .60) were no more 
effective in cuing central targets than no-object cues (t < 1). In other words, we do see object-to-
object binding, but only when objects that are the focus of attention at encoding were cued by 
other objects similarly in focus of attention during encoding. In contrast, peripheral target 
performance did not appear to be enhanced by the presence of any object, central (M = .20) or 
peripheral (M =.21) when compared to the no-object cue trials (M = .21; t<1). Thus, objects that 



























Figure 8. Graphic representation of the interaction between target type and test cue type on 
identification accuracy, collapsed across attention condition. 
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In short, object-to-object binding was observed, but only for those objects that were in the 
focus of attention during encoding. These findings support my earlier predictions; those objects 
in the focus of attention produce not only higher fidelity memories (Johnson, 1992; see also 
Levine & Edelstein, 2009), but also are more strongly bound to other central objects. 
Importantly, this evidence of binding was obtained using a procedure developed to be analogous 
to the one used by Starns and Hicks’ (2008), which rules out the possibility that the obtained 
differences were due to variability in the strength of item memory. 
There are a couple of potential reasons why evidence was obtained for binding in this 
experiment, but not in previous research (Starns & Hicks, 2005; 2008). First, complex event 
memories are associated with a much broader hierarchy of information (i.e., gist, context, 
ensemble, item etc.) as compared to individual objects. Because of this, it is possible that binding 
will occur more frequently at the scene level than at the object level. Second, there are 
procedural differences between these studies. One critical difference involved Starns and Hicks’ 
use of an incidental encoding procedure; in contrast, the current work used deliberate encoding. 
In order to observe feature binding in memory, it may be necessary to attend to the specific 
features at encoding. 
Is binding mediated by the nature of attention? There is evidence that the 
manipulation of how participants attended to these objects did have an effect on performance, but 
not specifically on binding processes. There was a significant interaction between target type and 
attention condition, F(1,154) = 15.29, p < .01, MSE = .04, ηp
2
= .09. As expected, performance 
for central targets (narrative = .59 and labels = .66) was significantly higher than peripheral 
targets (narrative = .22 and labels = .19). For participants in the labels condition, accuracy was 
higher for central targets but lower for peripheral targets when compared with the narrative 
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condition. This finding suggests that the labels manipulation increased memory for the central 
objects relative to the narrative manipulation. That is, those participants who were not provided 
any information concerning any named object’s role in that scene’s event, had better memory for 
those objects than those participants who were told about why these particular objects were 
important to the event.  
Importantly, there was no significant interaction between attention condition and cue type 
or between attention condition, target type and cue type (F ‘s< 1). Therefore, we must conclude 
that object-to-object binding was not appreciably affected by the inclusion of associative 
information at encoding. This finding suggests that participants do not need to deliberately attend 
to associative information in order for objects that had been in the focus of attention, to bind to 
one another.  
Additional Measures 
 Confidence measures. I will now turn to some of the supplementary measures, namely 
confidence ratings. As described earlier, participants were asked to rate their confidence in the 
accuracy of each identification judgment on a scale from 1 (guessing) to 7 (very sure).  
  Although there were no specific hypotheses for confidence judgments, they nevertheless 
provide important information about the perceived strength of memory evidence for targets. The 
following confidence results have been grouped according to the type of target identified (central 
or peripheral) and the type of test cue (central, peripheral, and no-object)
 4
. In addition, I focus on 
confidence ratings that reflect only accurate identification judgments. For descriptive statistics 
for confidence ratings see Table 2.  
                                                          
4 Because there was no significant interaction between attention condition and test cue type and 
no significant three-way interaction (i.e., differences in object-to-object binding between 
attention conditions) the following analyses collapsed across those conditions.  
43 
Because confidence ratings are only calculated for “hits”, not every participant enters into 
the analyses. For instance, it frequently happened that a participant did not make a hit for a 
peripheral item for every cue type. Running a 2 X 3 within-subjects ANOVA for Cue type and 
Target type would reduce the number of participants in the data set from 156 to 80. For this 
reason, I conducted a within-subjects ANOVA for central targets and peripheral targets 
separately. In each, Cue type functioned as the within-subjects variable. Using this method, no 
participants were excluded in the analysis for central targets; on the other hand, the analysis for 
peripheral targets reduced the number of participants to 80. It should be noted that all means 
discussed within the text reflect this reduced number of participants; in contrast, Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics for all participants. 
A significant effect of test cue type was obtained for central targets, F(2,310) = 22.68, p 
< .01, MSE = 0.79, ηp
2
 = .13. Pairwise comparisons reveal that central targets cued with central 
objects have significantly higher confidence ratings (M = 5.32) compared to either targets cued 
with peripheral objects (M = 4.83) or no-objects (M = 4.70). Unlike the central targets, there is 
no significant effect of test cue type for peripheral targets, F(2,158) = 2.73, p = .069, MSE = 
1.67. In short, these findings indicate that participants have more confidence in identifications 
when the test cue included objects that were in the participants’ focus of attention during 
encoding. From a signal detection theory perspective, this finding implies that the presence of 
central objects enabled participants to retrieve evidence of stronger memory for the correct 
target. That is, when objects, attended during the encoding of a complex visual scene, are present 
in the test cue, a more detailed representation of another attended object can be retrieved from 
the memory of this scene.  
44 
Response time measures. Figure 9 displays an average of participants’ median response 
times for identification judgments; response times are separated by accuracy of the identification, 
target type, and test cue type (no-object cue, central and peripheral-object cued). 
  In an examination of response time data (for both accurate and inaccurate judgments), a 2 
(Target type) X 3 (Test Cue type) within-subjects ANOVA revealed two main effects. First, 
participants were significantly faster for judgments where the target was central (M = 7591.45 
ms) as compared to when the target was peripheral (M = 9642.06 ms; F(1,155) = 213.34, p 
=.000, MSE = 4612126.88, ηp
2
 = .58). Second, participants were significantly faster when no 
objects were presented in the test cue (M = 8255.96 ms) as compared to test cues containing 
either peripheral objects (M = 8785.52) or central objects (M = 8808.80; F(2,310) = 11.99, p < 
.01, MSE = 2544767.54, ηp
2
= .07). Said another way, when objects were present in the test cue, 
participants took significantly longer to make their identifications as compared to when these 
objects were absent. There was no significant interaction between these two factors (F<1). 
Although these findings were not important to my research aims, they do suggest that the 
manipulation of test cue was effective. Participants were instructed to use all the information 
available in the test cue to make their identifications; as we see, participants took significantly 
more time with test cues that contained additional information that they needed to process 
(objects) than when that information was absent. 
Table 2 
Mean Confidence Ratings  
 Test Cue Type 
 Central-object cued Peripheral-object cued No-object cue 
Target Type    
Central Target 5.32 (0.11) 4.83 (0.11) 4.70  (0.11) 
Peripheral Target 3.66 (0.16) 3.04 (0.14) 3.19 (0.13) 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. Mean confidence ratings reflects the confidence 
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Figure 9. Average median response time for identifications separated by accuracy of identification, test 




 In the introduction, I discussed the idea that complex events are represented in memory at 
multiple levels. One major goal of Experiment 2 was to explore the role of contextual 
information in binding. In particular, the focus was on object-to-context binding, which was 
accomplished by providing clear contextual (background) information in some test cue 
conditions. Since evidence of object-to-object binding was observed in Experiment 1, the focus 
of Experiment 2 was on determining the relative cuing value of context. That is, I explored 
whether adding contextual information to object-cued trials provides a better cue compared to 
either context alone (Experiment 2) or objects alone (Experiment 1).   
Methodological Changes in Experiment 2 
To address these questions, Experiment 2 included the following methodological 
changes. First, all trials, with the exception of the no-object cued trials, included undistorted 
contextual (i.e. background) information. Using the same procedure as for the no-object cue 
trials, all individual objects were removed from the original scene. Any information that 
remained was considered contextual information (e.g., large furniture like couches/beds, and 
permanent fixtures like windows/doors). Unlike the no-object cue scenes, this information was 
not blurred; instead, it was presented unaltered from the learning phase. Second, Exp. 2’s cued 
trials were subdivided into three categories. In addition to a modification of Experiment 1’s 
central-object cued trials and peripheral-object cued trials, participants were also presented with 
context-only cued trials. As the label implies, these trials did not contain any object information; 
rather participants were only provided with the undistorted background information with the 
target-marker (see Figure 10 for examples).  
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Because we found no binding differences when comparing the between-subjects 
manipulation of attention (narrative vs. labels) in Exp. 1, the narrative condition was eliminated 
in the current study. Thus, all participants in Exp. 2 heard only the object labels, rather than a 
narrative concerning the objects within the scene.  
Predictions for Experiment 2 
In this study, the goal was to examine the role of context on memory binding, and in 
particular, the binding between objects, and their context. With respect to object-to-context 
binding, I hypothesized that context-only cue trials would enhance performance accuracy relative 
to no-object cue test trials based on the findings of previous research on context cuing 
(Brockmole et al., 2006; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Hollingworth et al., 2001).  
 
A) Learning Phase Scene 
C) Context-Only Cued Test Trial 
Scene 
B) No-Object cue Test Trial Scene 
D) Objects + Context Cued Test Trial 
Scene 
 
Figure 10. Comparison between the original encoding scene (A) and the three types of test 
scenes: no-object cue trial scenes (B), context-only cued trial scenes (C), and objects + context 
cued trial scenes (central or peripheral; D). 
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Experiment 2: Methods 
Participants 
 One hundred LSU students participated in Experiment 2. A power analysis for Exp. 2, 
computed using G*power (Faul et al., 2009) suggested that the appropriate number of subjects to 
achieve 80% power was 84. This value was determined based on the following parameters: A) an 
ES f of .15 (calculated from Exp. 1’s test cue measure’s ηp
2
 = .02), B) a type I error rate of .05, 
C) a within-subjects ANOVA with four levels, and D) an estimated .29 correlation between 
measures. Participants were comprised of students taking psychology courses at Louisiana State 
University; each received course credit for their involvement.  
Stimuli 
Learning phase scenes. The same series of 12 complex visual scenes used in Experiment 
1 were also used in this current study. 
Learning phase auditory files. Like Experiment 1, each of the visual scenes was paired 
with an auditory file; visual scene and auditory file were presented simultaneously. This auditory 
information served to emphasize certain objects within the scene. Unlike Experiment 1, the 
current study only included auditory files similar to those used in Exp. 1’s labels condition. The 
only difference between Exp. 1’s auditory information and the current study’s auditory 
information concerned the rate at which each object name was spoken. In Exp. 1, each object 
was named in the same temporal position as those objects that were discussed in the narrative 
condition. In the current study, the object names were spoken at an even rate (the onset of each 
spoken object occurred every four seconds). This change was made to allow participants an 
equal amount of time to attend to each object.  
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Testing phase scenes. As in the previous experiment, the testing phase presented altered 
versions of the original learning phase scenes. Overall, the testing phase was unchanged from 
Exp.1. Each scene still contained an altered version of the learning phase scene, four target 
markers, and an array of six objects. The primary difference between Exp.1 and the current study 
involved what information from the original scene was displayed. As before, some of the test 
scenes displayed more information than others; however, instead of three trial categories, test 
scenes were separated into four categories: 1) no-object cue test scenes, 2) context-only cued test 
scenes and 3/4) objects + context cued test scenes (displayed either central or peripheral objects). 
Across the experiment, each scene served as a no-object cued, context-only cued, and objects + 
context cued (central or peripheral) scene equally often. 
No-object cue test scenes. No-object cue test scenes were unchanged from Exp. 1. They 
displayed a blurred version of the original learning phase scene without any object information.  
Context-only cued test scenes. In contrast, context-only cued test scenes presented the 
original background information without any distortion. For these test scenes, its corresponding 
original study scene was stripped of all object information, similar to the no-object cue test 
scenes. Unlike the no-object cue test scenes, the remaining information was not altered in any 
way.  
Objects + context cued test scenes. As the label suggests, objects + context test scenes 
were identical to the context-only cued test scenes with the exception that they also included 
three objects from the original learning phase scene. Like Exp. 1, objects displayed as cues were 
selected from that scene’s central or peripheral object pool. Consequentially, these test scenes 
were further divided into central objects + context cued scenes and peripheral objects + context 
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cued scenes. Each of the three objects were shown in their original spatial locations and 
remained unchanged from the learning phase.   
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1. The study was still 
split into two phases, the learning phase, and the testing phase. During the first phase, 
participants were asked to study a series of scenes and to pay particular attention to those objects 
mentioned in the audio information. Like Exp. 1, after each scene, participants were tested on 
their memory for one of these central objects. After all 12 scenes and their corresponding 
auditory information had been presented; participants were provided with testing phase 
instructions and started the testing phase of the experiment.  
During this phase, participants again made identifications for each of the 12 testing phase 
scenes. Participants identified four target objects, two central and two peripheral, from each 
scene; participants completed a confidence rating after each judgment. Once all 48 
identifications had been made, participants were asked a series of demographic questions and 
received a debriefing statement.   
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Experiment 2: Results 
As Exp. 1 provided evidence for object-to-object binding, Exp. 2 concentrated on binding 
between objects and context. To accomplish this goal, those test cues used in Exp. 1 were 
modified to include contextual information in the current study. In addition, a new test cue type, 
one that only included undistorted background information, was added (i.e. context-only cued). 
Thus, Exp. 2 included four test cue types: no-object cue (unchanged from Exp. 1), central objects 
+ context cued, peripheral objects + context cued, and context-only cued. 
As in Exp. 1, partial eta squared was used as the estimate of effect size and α < .05 was 
used as the criterion for significance. Figure 11 displays the average accuracy rates for 
judgments associated with each of the four test cue types separated by the two target types. As in 
Exp. 1, the probability of choosing the correct target by chance was 16.6%. The specific focus of 
the current experiment was to explore the relative cuing value of context. Like Exp. 1, this 
involved two separate questions. Does attention influence the probability that an object will bind 
to its context? Will the relative cueing value of a test cue (i.e. the strength of the binding between 
the test cue and the to-be-remembered object) be enhanced if objects (central or peripheral) are 
included with their original context? In other words, I examined whether providing undistorted 
background information improved accurate identifications and whether this interacted with 
attention during encoding. To explore these points, a 2 (Target type) X 4 (Test Cue type) within-
subjects ANOVA was conducted with accuracy as the dependent variable.  
Like Exp. 1, the principal analyses focus on how the test cue type (no-object, context-
only, objects + context [central or peripheral]) affected the probability of identifying the correct 
missing target object. Again, each target object was selected from those objects that either were 
in the focus of attention during the encoding phase, or were peripheral to those attended objects.  
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Object-to-Context Binding  
The 2 (Target type) X 4 (Test Cue type) within-subjects ANOVA yielded both a 
significant main effect of target type, again with higher accuracy rates for central targets (M = 
.65) compared to peripheral targets (M = .24), F(1,99) = 713.11, p < .01, MSE = .05,  ηp
2
= .88, 
and a significant main effect of test cue type, F(3,297) = 11.46, p < .01, MSE = .03, ηp
2
= .10. 
Pairwise comparisons reveal that test cues containing context, central objects + context (M = 
.46), peripheral objects + context (M = .47) and context-only (M = .47), led to significantly 
higher performance than no-object cue test trials (M = .38); yet, the test cues containing context 
were not significantly different from one another.  
Again replicating Exp. 1, these results were qualified by a significant interaction, 
F(23,297) = 4.57, p = .004, MSE = .03, ηp
2
= .04. To explore this interaction, the effect of test cue 
type was evaluated separately for the two target types (see Figure 11 for a graphical 
representation). For both central and peripheral targets, a significant effect of test cue type was 
found, F(3,297) = 9.53, p < .01, MSE = .04, ηp
2
= .09 (central targets); F(3,297) = 6.17, p < .01, 
MSE = .03, ηp
2
= .06 (peripheral targets). For central targets, pairwise comparisons reveal that the 
no-object cue test trial was associated with significantly lower accuracy rates (M = .56) as 
compared to the other test cue types (central obj. + context = .69, peripheral obj. + context = .65 
and context-only = .68). This finding indicates that context alone is sufficient for cueing an 
object that was in the focus of attention during encoding; further, the addition of any object to the 
test cue did not provide any further aid in retrieving information about the missing target. 
Unlike the central targets, pairwise comparisons for peripheral targets show a slightly 
altered pattern. First, it was found that the no-object cue test trial was associated with 
significantly lower performance (M = .19) compared to either the context-only cued (M = .25) 
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and the peripheral obj. + context cued test trials (M = .29), however, the no-object cue test trial 
was not significantly different from the central obj. + context cued trial (M = .22). Taken as a 
whole, there is some evidence suggesting that the presence of objects may influence the cuing 
value of context in certain circumstances. It appears that when the context itself is a poor cue 
(because the target object was not attended to during encoding; i.e. peripheral target) the addition 
of other non-attended objects can enhance the cueing value of that context (as compared to when 
attended objects were added to the context cue; i.e. central obj. + context cued).  
With regards to my original research question, it appears that when the missing target 
object was studied during encoding, no differences in identification accuracy were found when 
additional objects were present in the test cue (whether or not they were central or peripheral to 
attention during encoding). This would suggest that the cueing value for context and the cueing 
value for objects are not additive.  
However, this pattern is slightly altered when the missing target object was not in the 
focus of attention during encoding. It appears that when the cueing value (i.e. identification 
accuracy) for context is drastically reduced (from .68 [central targets] to .25 [peripheral targets]), 
the addition of objects to the test cue does slightly enhance identification accuracy. Specifically, 
it was found that providing both context and peripheral objects improved performance for 
peripheral targets, but only when compared to their central object counterparts.  
Additional Measures 
 Confidence measures. For descriptive statistics concerning confidence ratings for 
judgments associated with each of the four test cue types and two target types see Table 3. Like 
Exp. 1, the following analyses reflect only confidence ratings associated with accurate 
identifications. Two within-subjects ANOVA’s were conducted, separately for target type 
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(central and peripheral) using Cue type as the within-subjects variable for both. With these 
analyses, only four participants were excluded in the analysis for central targets, however, 
analysis for peripheral targets reduced the number of participants from 100 to 42. Like Exp. 1, all 
means discussed within the text reflect this reduced number of participants; in contrast, Table 3 
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Figure 11. Graphic representation of identification accuracy between the two target types and four 
test cue types. 
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Like Exp. 1, a significant main effect of test cue type for central targets was found
5
, 
F(2.66, 252.78) = 27.41, p < .01, MSE = 1.25, ηp
2
 = .22. Pairwise comparisons reveal that central 
targets cued with central objs. + context have significantly higher confidence ratings (M = 5.68) 
compared to any other test cue type (peripheral objs. + context = 5.34, context-only = 5.23 or no-
object cue = 4.36). Furthermore, both peripheral objs. + context and context-only cues have 
significantly higher confidence ratings compared to no-object cue trials, but they are not 
significantly different from each other. A significant main effect of test cue type was also 
obtained for peripheral targets
5
, F(2.46, 100.84) = 3.78, p = .019, MSE = 3.44, ηp
2
 = .08. 
Pairwise comparisons show that although targets cued by central objs. + context have 
significantly higher confidence ratings (M = 3.77) compared to peripheral targets cued with 
peripheral objs. + context (M = 2.80), central objs.  + context cues are not significantly different 
from those targets cued with context-only (M = 3.88) or no-object cue trials (M = 3.21). 
Peripheral objs.  + context cues are also associated with significantly lower confidence ratings 
compared to context only cues, but do not differ from confidence ratings where no-object were 
presented in the cue. 
In short, these findings indicate that participants have the most confidence in those 
identifications where the test cue included objects that were in the participants’ focus of attention 
during encoding. Thus, it appears that the presence of central objects did enhance confidence in 
those decisions even when only accurate judgments where examined. In addition, confidence is 
enhanced when test cues contain context only or context + objects that were not attended to 
during encoding, when compared to test cues containing only a distorted version of the original 
context.  
                                                          
5
 Because this analysis violated Mauchly’s test of Sphericity a Greenhouse-Geisser correction 
was used. 
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From a signal detection theory perspective, this finding suggests that the presence of 
either contextual information and/or objects from the original encoded scene enabled participants 
to retrieve a stronger memory for the correct target. This was most true when the test cue 
provided contextual information and objects that were originally in the focus of attention.  
Response time measures. Figure 12 displays participants’ average median response time 
for identification judgments separated by: target type and test cue type. By and large, the same 
pattern of findings was obtained when comparing the average median response time for 
participants’ in Exp. 1 to the current study’s response time data. A 2 (Target type) X 4 (Test Cue 
type) within-subjects ANOVA shows a main effect of Target type; judgments for central targets 
were significantly faster (M = 6645.92 ms) than judgments for peripheral targets (M = 8662.92 
ms; F(1, 99) = 167.36, p < .01, MSE = 4861733.71, ηp
2
= .63). 
Second, a main effect of test cue type was obtained, F(2.63, 260.22) = 10.81, p < .01, 
MSE = 8486825.91, ηp
2
= .10. Pairwise comparisons reveal that participants were fastest when 
cued with no-objects (M = 7117.15 ms); furthermore, targets cued with context-only (M = 
7563.54 ms) were significantly faster than if cued by either central (M = 7944.83 ms) or 
peripheral (M = 7992.17 ms) objs. + context, which were not significantly different from one 
another.  
However, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F(3,297) = 4.47, 
p = .004, MSE =2234734.37, ηp
2
= .04. To explore this interaction, a within-subjects ANOVA 
was conducted for each Target type, with Cue type as the within-subject variable for both 
analyses. For peripheral targets, there was a significant main effect of target type, F(3,297) = 
12.41, p < .01, MSE = 2964366.32, ηp
2
= .11, with both the no-object cued (M = 7951.43 ms) and 
context-only cued (M = 8366.30 ms) targets significantly faster than either central objs. + context 
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(M = 9193.26 ms) and peripheral objs. + context (M = 9140.68 ms), but not significantly 
different from one another. Although there was no significant main effect of cue type for central 
targets
5
 F(2.60, 257.22)  = 2.68, p = .056, the pattern of results is very similar to that of the 
peripheral targets. 
 In the same way as Exp. 1, when any information was added to the test cue (context, 
objects, or both), generally participants took significantly longer to make their identifications. 
These findings tell us that the experimental manipulation was, again, effective; participants 
instructed to use all pertinent information to make their identifications appeared to take more 
time to process test cues that contained more information.  
Table 3 
Mean Confidence Ratings 
 
Test Cue Type 
Central Objs. + 
Context 





   Central Target 5.69 (0.10) 5.31 (0.12) 5.24 (0.14) 4.38 (0.17) 
Peripheral Target 3.69 (0.19) 3.08 (0.18) 3.66 (0.20) 3.00 (0.22) 
Note: Standard errors appear in parentheses. Mean confidence ratings reflects the confidence 
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Figure 12. Participants’ average median response time for identification judgments separated by 




The preceding studies examined the structure of memory for a complex event, 
specifically how individual components of these memories are bound together. There were four 
main findings. First, cueing one aspect of an event (object or context) can increase the likelihood 
that another aspect of that event (i.e. object) will be retrieved. In other words, both Exps.1 and 2 
found evidence for object-to-object binding and object-to-context binding. Second, when objects 
are the only cue used to retrieve other missing objects (Exp. 1), the boost to retrieval is only 
evident when the cued information and the to-be-retrieved information were both in the focus of 
attention during encoding. That is, attention plays a critical role in whether individual objects 
become bound to other objects or to background information. In general, targets that were the 
focus of attention displayed the highest accuracy rates in both Exp. 1 and 2. Moreover, when 
cued with central objects (Exp. 1) the accuracy for central targets was significantly increased 
relative to those targets cued by other information (i.e., peripheral objects, or no-objects).Third, 
and contrary to my initial hypothesis, there was no evidence suggesting that binding depends on 
attention to the relationships between those to-be-bound elements of a complex event during 
encoding. More specifically in Exp. 1, there were no significant binding differences between 
participants who were provided information linking objects in the focus of attention versus 
merely attending to these central objects during the encoding phase. Fourth, Exp. 2 provides 
limited evidence suggesting that the cueing value of context may be increased when object 
information is added to the test cue. That is there are limited circumstances where both context 
and object information provides a better cue than merely the context alone. This finding was only 
obtained when peripheral targets were cued with both context and other peripheral objects. In 
other words, this result was only found when memory for the target was weak (not in the focus 
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of attention during encoding) and the test cue contained objects that were also weakly encoded. 
For all remaining target and test cue combinations, there was no increase in accurate 
identifications when test cues included both objects and context. 
As a whole, these findings appear consistent with a number of previously mentioned 
studies examining feature-to-feature binding in memory (Meiser & Bröder, 2002; Meiser et al., 
2008; Uncapher et al., 2006). In particular, Meiser et al.’s study provides findings that are most 
equivalent to the current studies’ results. Like other feature binding experiments, Meiser et al. 
found evidence of binding between font size and location. More importantly however, they 
found this binding exclusively for items judged to be “remembered” (indicating distinct 
recollection) as compared to those items that were judged to be “known” (indicating a feeling of 
familiarity). Although the methods differ considerably, Meiser et al.’s “remembered” items are 
arguably similar to the current study’s central objects. Participants were instructed to only select 
“remember” when the word evoked a “conscious and maybe vivid recollection of a word’s prior 
occurrence” (p. 36). In order for participants to have this conscious recollection, they must have 
devoted a minimal amount of attention to these items. Likewise, items that were judged to be 
“known”, could be considered similar to our peripheral items, in that they may not have been 
directly attended to, but some aspect of the item (e.g., feature) may be retrieved from long-term 
memory. 
Furthermore, the findings of the current study also replicate several studies that have 
examined the relationship between memory for an individual item and its context (Brockmole et 
al., 2006; Chun & Jiang, 2003; Hollingworth, 1998; Hollingworth, 2007; Hollingworth & 
Henderson, 1999; Hollingworth et al., 2001) or other groups of objects (Brady & Alvarez, 2011; 
Brady et al., 2009; see also Chun & Turk-Browne, 2008 for a review of associative learning in 
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vision). As previously described, Hollingworth’s (2007) study of contextual cueing found that 
individual item memory was enhanced when presented with its original context. Although the 
definition of what they term “context” (all information excluding the to-be-tested object) is 
slightly different from the current study’s definition (scene information minus all individual 
objects), the results of the current work are in line with their findings. To summarize, 
Hollingworth (2007) assessed participants’ memory for individual objects within a series of 
complex scenes. He tested memory by asking participants to complete a discrimination task for 
these objects (which may or may not have changed from the original scene). These objects were 
shown amid their original context, another studied context, or on a blank screen. They found that 
the original context (as compared to another studied context or no context) increased 
participants’ accuracy in detecting whether the object had been altered. Although there are clear 
differences between their methods and the procedure used in the current work, my results 
suggest that providing correct contextual information enhances memory for individual objects as 
compared to providing degraded context (arguably similar to no context).  
While my findings are consistent with the results of several related studies, there are 
some notable exceptions. One exception comes from Starns and Hicks’ (2005, 2008) work. 
While I took steps to ensure that the methodology used in this study did not suffer from the same 
flaw as other feature binding research, I found evidence of binding while they did not. However, 
it is important to note that although Starns and Hicks provided the template for my research 
design, the aims of my research were considerably different from the goals of their studies.  
As described in the introduction, Starns and Hicks (2005, 2008), argued that early 
evidence of feature binding in memory may have been easily explained by their variable strength 
hypothesis. That is, the correlations between the different features of an item may be illusory and 
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merely due to the strength of the memory for the item itself. One may remember both features of 
an item because they have a very strong memory for that item, conversely, weaker memory for 
an item may result in weaker memory for features associated with that item. Thus, when the 
actual item is presented, it may cue both features or neither feature depending on the strength of 
the memory trace. To account for this flaw, participants in their work were never presented with 
the original item, but were only given one feature of an item (color or location) as a cue to 
remember the other feature. In this way, participants could only use that one feature as a cue for 
the second feature. Similarly, my methodology ensured that the original item (i.e. scene) was 
never presented as a cue. Although I did not use one feature to cue another (as the current work 
was not meant to examine feature binding), I instead used the closest analogous cue, a set of 
objects (excluding the original scene information) as a cue for another object. Since the original 
scene was not presented to participants as a cue, they would not have been able to use their 
“scene” memory as a retrieval cue for the missing object. Furthermore, if participants were able 
to use this degraded scene information to retrieve the actual scene I should have found similar 
performance between the no-object cue scenes and the object-cued scenes. Instead, I found a 
significant increase in identification accuracy between these two target types. 
Although my findings may appear inconsistent with the findings of Starns and Hicks’ 
(2005, 2008), there are two major reasons that may account for this difference. First, Starns and 
Hicks (2005) note that their feature dimensions (font size and location) did not share an obvious 
relationship to one another. This independence may have made it difficult for participants to 
organize this information into a higher order representation. They suggest that using other source 
dimensions (i.e. features) that are more easily integrated may produce different findings. Due to 
the nature of the stimuli used in the current study, it could be argued that the objects in each 
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scene were easily and naturally integrated into a higher order representation (Hollingworth, 
2009). Each scene was designed to resemble a real world setting. This meant that all objects 
designed to be hung on a wall, placed on a table, or situated on the floor were positioned in those 
locations. Furthermore, each scene type (living room, bedroom, and office) included both objects 
and contextual information (i.e., large furniture [beds, couches, desks]) consistent with that room 
type. This would allow participants to encode each scene into a kind of mental model. 
(Radvansky & Copeland, 2000). 
Traditionally the term mental model has been used to describe the mental representations 
created after having read a list of objects and their various locations (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2000). However, the primary characteristics (objects and locations organized into the structure of 
a memory representation) are very applicable to the current work. One key point to the concept 
of mental models is that the spatial relationships between objects affect retrieval (Radvansky & 
Copeland, 2004). The easier it is to integrate the various elements of a scene into a higher order 
construct (mental model), the easier it is to retrieve specific information from various elements in 
the structure. For this reason, I argue that the elements of the stimuli used in both Exp. 1 and 2 
had clear and natural relationships with one another, which facilitated their integration into a 
structured memory representation.  
The second reason that the current findings may diverge from those of Starns and Hicks 
(2008) is related to my attention manipulation. Starns and Hicks acknowledge that their findings 
may not generalize to those studies that encourage participants to intentionally learn the to-be-
bound attributes. They explain that one reason their results differ from previous work may be 
that their methodology did not include an intentional learning component. Their findings are 
more pertinent to the independence of peripheral components; how they are only integrated into 
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the overarching memory, but not bound to one another. This interpretation of their findings 
would be supported by the current work. In Exp. 1 and 2, the attention manipulation directed 
participants to intentionally learn certain “components” of the complex scene, while ignoring (to 
a more or lesser degree) the remaining information in the scene. Object-to-object binding was 
found solely between those objects that were directly attended to during the encoding phase.  
Outside of feature binding research, a small number of studies also seem inconsistent 
with the current findings. For example, in the eyewitness literature, Fisher and Cuervo (1983) 
found no relationship between accurately recalling two distinct traits associated with a group of 
individuals (gender and language). In this study, Fisher and Cuervo asked participants to listen to 
a mock court proceeding with the goal of deciding which group was entitled to disputed land. An 
unannounced source test revealed that accurately identifying one trait had no relationship to 
accurately selecting the second trait. They interpreted this finding to suggest that episodic event 
memories contain multiple features that are independent of one another. They argued that if these 
traits were bound together, then recalling one trait should affect recall of the second trait.  
In a related study, Brewer et al. (1999) found no correlation between the accuracy of 
memory concerning one aspect of a crime (e.g., description of the offender, offender’s actions, 
description of the bystander etc.) with other aspects of that same crime. These findings, along 
with other similar research (see Fisher et al., 2009), led Fisher and colleagues to argue that the 
individual components of an event are relatively independent.  
As in the previous discussion of Starns and Hicks’ (2005, 2008) work, the reason behind 
why these findings and the results of the current studies diverge may be due to variability in 
attention at the time of encoding. In Fisher and Cuervo’s (1983) research, they manipulated how 
relevant a given trait (gender and language) was to completing the task. The participants’ task 
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goal was to evaluate a series of arguments from two groups and rule in favor of the group with 
the best argument. What was fundamental to this task was the association between the statement 
(argument) and the group identity. For a given participant, only one feature (gender or language) 
helped to differentiate these groups. Consequently, there was no benefit to attending to the non-
discriminating trait, as it was irrelevant to the task goal. As a result, binding between traits may 
have been reduced because attention was focused on the salient trait (and not on the other trait) 
or task demands discouraged the creation of these bindings.   
In Brewer et al. (1999), participants’ attention during a complex event was allowed to 
vary freely. This freedom allows for unique patterns of attention. Their primary measure of 
interest concerned the correlations between memory for details sorted into different categories. 
Averaging across both details (putting them into a category) and participants may have obscured 
the detection of a relationship. For example, some participants may have found information 
concerning the offender’s actions very attention grabbing, while others focused on the 
bystander’s appearance. Due to this variability, some items may have been bound together while 
others may show no relationship.  
Not only do the current studies’ findings support this possible interpretation, the work of 
Wells and Leippe (1981) lends credence to this argument. In a similar procedure, Wells and 
Leippe had participants witness a staged theft, complete a lineup identification, and answer an 
11-item questionnaire. This questionnaire assessed each participant’s memory for the peripheral 
details of the room where the staged theft took place (e.g., how many light bulbs were on, how 
many chairs were in the room?). Overall accuracy for the questionnaire was negatively correlated 
with identification accuracy (r = -.41). Importantly however, the correlations between 
identification accuracy and accuracy for particular questions within this questionnaire varied 
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significantly (two items showed slight positive correlations, and only one item showed a 
significant negative correlation when isolated). This suggests that with more items (and 
categories of items) the correlations between accuracy for a variety of information may be 
diluted. 
 As discussed in the introduction, both Johnson’s MEM framework (1983, 1992) and 
Brady et al.’s (2011) Hierarchical Feature Bundle (HFB) theory appear to make relevant 
predictions for the current study. By and large, both provide arguments for the structure of long-
term memory (general or specifically visual memory) that are consistent with my overall 
findings. As previously explained , MEM describes specific subsystems that are responsible for 
the creation of event memories The reflection subsystem is particularly relevant as it is 
responsible for creating links between objects, actions and context that, in turn, allow event 
memory to appear both cohesive and coherent. The reflection subsystem is argued to be 
controlled by a person’s agenda (i.e., their goals) which create processing differences resulting in 
central and peripheral information. Relationships between these central items are created through 
other functions, such as shifting (directing attention from one thing to another) and noting 
(identifying how these items may be related). In short, these functions increase the 
interconnectedness between central items as well as their fidelity in memory. As a consequence, 
the memory representation becomes more cohesive. 
Similarly, the Hierarchical Feature Bundle (HFB) suggests that complex visual memory, 
scene memory, is represented in a higher order structure. As mentioned previously, the 
information in these differing levels of the structure vary from the specific features of an object 
to the gist of the scene itself. Most importantly, elements within and between these levels of 
abstraction interact with one another (are both informative and constricting; for further research 
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examining the relationships between these elements see research in visual statistical learning; 
Brady & Alvarez, 2011; Brady et al., 2009; Baker et al., 2004; Fiser & Aslin, 2001, 2002, 2005; 
Turk-Browne et al., 2005). HFB also highlights the role attention plays in not only encoding 
these elements, but also in how they may interact. They suggest that attention shifts amongst 
featural information, contextual information, and general scene structure. As this information 
accrues, it also interacts, affecting where attention will be deployed and also influencing memory 
for the information itself. That is, information that has been encoded influences shifts of 
attention, which then affects what additional information is encoded and integrated into the 
overall scene representation.     
Most of the predictions taken from both the MEM framework and HFB are not only 
supported by the current study, but the current procedure itself can be easily translated into the 
operation of MEM’s reflection subsystem. For example, participants were given directions (i.e. 
an agenda) to attend to specific objects. As each object was mentioned, participants were told to 
shift their attention to that named object. This agenda controlled how attention was shifted and 
where it was allocated. As a consequence, objects that were central (specific objects that 
participants were told to attend to) were separated from those that were peripheral (all remaining 
objects)
6
. At this point participants noted the relationships between each item and bound them 
together. 
It is important to mention that although this noting clearly took place
7
, it appeared to be 
unaffected by the between-subjects manipulation of the nature of attention. That is, providing 
additional information relating objects to each other did not increase binding. The intention of 
                                                          
6
 Evidence supporting this statement comes from the accuracy differences between targets that 
were central and those that were peripheral.  
7
 This argument is supported by the significant accuracy differences between central targets cued 
with central objects and central targets cued with either peripheral objects or no objects. 
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this manipulation was to either provide or withhold information that may be used to actively 
create the bindings between related objects. Participants in the narrative condition were told to 
not only attend to the objects, but also the additional details that denoted relationships between 
these objects. Participants in the labels condition were merely given the instruction to pay 
attention to the objects that were named; no further information concerning how these objects 
were related was provided. It has been argued that binding, in certain circumstances, may require 
both attention to the to-be-bound items and a deliberate intention to encode how they are related 
(Morey, 2011). According to Morey, the need for this explicit intention to encode relationships 
may increase based on the difficulty of the recognition task (i.e., how many letters and spatial 
locations needed to be bound in an individual trial; set size). Due to the complexity of the current 
study’s task, I predicted that binding would require an explicit intention to encode the 
relationships between items. In other words, I expected to find significantly more binding in the 
narrative condition than the labels condition. While there was no notable difference between 
binding in these conditions, it was clear that all participants both shifted their attention and noted 
relationships between central items, regardless of condition. Although participants in the labels 
condition were not given additional auditory information that related the objects, the visual 
information alone could provide many details that may have linked central objects together (e.g., 
their location within the scene, color similarities, any similarities in function etc.). Thus, these 
participants may have actively related the objects to each other even in the absence of narrative 
information. 
Summary 
 The foregoing studies were designed to examine how the components of a complex event 
are bound into a unified structure and what role attention may play in this binding process. The 
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results revealed that the individual components of a complex scene (i.e. objects) are not only 
bound to the overall scene information (i.e., context, Exp. 2) but also to other objects (Exp. 1). 
This suggests that these components of complex memories may be, under some circumstances, 
relatively dependent rather than independent. Furthermore, these results suggest that focused 
attention may be necessary to bind together certain components of a complex event (i.e. object-
to-object), but may be less necessary to bind together other components (object-to-context). 
 This finding has important implications, particularly for false memory research. The 
results of the current work suggest that certain components of a complex event may require more 
attention to be bound into the memory structure than other components. This could imply that 
these components may be more vulnerable to binding problems and thus errors in memory.  
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Examples of Testing Scene Types: No-object cue (Exp. 1 & 2), Object-cued (Exp. 1), Context-only cued (Exp. 2), Objects+ 
Context cued (Exp. 2)  
 
 
No-object cued Scene Trial 






Object-cued Scene Trial (Exp. 1) 






Context-Only Cued Scene Trial (Exp. 2) 














LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY – BATON ROUGE CAMPUS 
Study Title: Memory for Scenes 
The purpose of this experiment is to explore how people learn and remember events. In this 
experiment you will be asked to view a series of scenes and answer some questions about them. 
This is entirely voluntary and you will not be penalized in any way for not volunteering. Your 
involvement will last approximately thirty minutes and you will receive extra credit or partial 
course credit in your psychology course for your participation. 
Any discomforts or risks that may result from participation are minimal. On the other hand, 
participating in this experiment will allow you to learn more about the ways that researchers 
investigate people’s cognitive abilities. The data gathered on you will be kept confidential 
because all the information you provide will be coded numerically. The coded data will only be 
examined by duly authorized representative of the research team and you are assured that the 
information will not be used for any other purpose other than the scientific goals of the 
experiment. If you choose to participate, you are free to stop at any time without penalty of any 
sort. Information on LSU policy and procedures for research participation can be obtained by 
contacting Dr. Robert Mathews, Chairman, Institutional Review Board, 578-8692. 
Any questions you may have regarding procedures or any other aspect of the study can be 
answered by contacting Dr. Sean Lane in the Department of Psychology at 578-4098. 
I have been briefed by the project director (or designate) in detail about this project and 
understand what my participation involves. I agree to participate with the understanding that I 
may withdraw at any time. I agree with the terms above and have read and understood this 
consent form.  
 
___________________________     _______________________ 
Participant Signature        Today’s Date 
_____________________________ 
Print Your Name 
___________________________     _______________________ 
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